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ABSTRACT
The 2008 global economic and financial crisis hit hard in Iceland and Latvia. Economic developments prior to the crisis, 
as well as response to the crisis were, however, different in these two countries, yielding different results. Both countries 
received assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the crisis and the IMF has labeled their reform 
programs as success stories. This article reviews and evaluates the post crisis situation in Iceland and Latvia, both in 
terms economic performance, as well as social progress. It also discusses how other countries, as well a multilateral 
institutions, may have influenced the reform programs in Iceland and Latvia.
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Introduction
The 2008 global economic and financial crisis hit hard in Iceland and Latvia. Both countries responded, 
but in a different way. In terms of fiscal adjustment the governments of both countries implemented painful 
budget cuts although the front loaded fiscal austerity program in Latvia was more radical. When it comes 
to exchange rate policy the response was different. Latvia, an EU member state, maintained fixed exchange 
rate, the Lat pegged to the Euro. In contrast the Icelandic krona depreciated sharply and the government 
introduced a policy of capital controls2. Latvia received extensive external assistance during the crisis while 
Iceland was isolated and “friendly” nations hesitated to get involved and some were hostile3.
When crisis of this magnitude hit small countries like Iceland and Latvia are challenged to respond to 
the immediate economic and social problems that follow and decide whom to work with to resolve them, 
1 Hilmar Þór Hilmarsson – PhD Professor, University of Akureyri, Iceland, Visiting Scholar University of Washing-
ton, USA. Scientific interests: Economic Policy
E-mail: hilmar@unak.is.
Tel.: +354 849 8380 
2 While Iceland is not a member of the European Union it is part of the Euorpean Economic Area where labor, goods, 
services and capital are to flow freely. Captial controls are inconsistent with this policy, but in the case of Iceland 
the international community thorugh the IMF, and thus the EU, accepted capital controls in Iceand. The questions 
remains how long this policy will be accepted and when the government of Iceland is prepared to remove these 
controls.
3 Faroe Islands, Poland and Russia were the only countries that supported Iceland from the beginning. Scandinavian 
countries initally hesitated to get involved. The UK was very hostile. Iceland‘s dispute with the UK and the 
Netherlands, because of the so called ICESAVE accounts,may have influnenced the Scandinavian Countries. The 
government of Iceland probably overestimated potential support from the Scandinavian countries who were more 
likely to serve their own economic and political interests in the UK and in the Netherlands, than supporting Iceland 
during a period of crisis and uncertanty.
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including the IMF, the EU and other countries. The objective of this article is to compare how these two small 
countries responded in terms of economic policy, which institutions and countries they cooperated with, and 
with what results in terms of economic growth and social progress. 
After more than 5 years since the crisis erupted sufficient time has passed for observers to begin see-
ing the outcomes from the different policy responses, both in terms of economic performance and social 
progress, and it is maybe time to see what lessons can be learned, for Latvia and Iceland and perhaps also 
for the European Union and the Euro area. In addition to reviewing the economic performance of those two 
countries in terms of GDP growth and unemployment, among the tasks of this article is also to consider their 
post crisis performance based on newly developed indicators that also measure poverty and social exclusion. 
The purpose is to highlight that it is insufficient to only look at countries economic growth performance to 
measure the success of their reform programs. Social outcomes are also important and affect long term eco-
nomic growth. 
The methodology used in this article is the case study method. Compared to other research methods, a 
case study enables the researcher to examine the issues at hand in greater depth. According to Yin (Yin, 2009: 
101−102) six sources of evidence are most commonly used in case studies. These are: documentation, ar-
chival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts. Each of these 
sources has advantages and disadvantages and according to Yin one should “note that no single source has 
a complete advantage over all the others. In fact, the various sources are highly complementary, and a good 
case study will therefore want to use as many sources as possible” (Yin, 2009: 101). 
Among the sources of evidence used for the analysis in this article are documentation/secondary data, 
including reports and scholarly literature, articles and books. Direct observation also plays a role in this article 
as the author draws on his experience and observations while living in Iceland prior to and during the crisis 
and having worked for the World Bank in Latvia for four years. However, preference was given to using well-
documented evidence that is publicly available and listed in the references. This case study does not present 
results that can be evaluated on the basis of statistical significance and one should be careful in generalizing 
the findings of one case study onto another case or situation. However, some lessons from the study could 
have wider relevance than for Iceland and Latvia only. This is especially true for small countries with a large 
banking sector, using their own currency, and with limited fiscal space to support the banks during a crisis.
1. Iceland and Latvia and the success of their reform programs
In 2011 the sitting prime minister of Latvia co-authored a book, “How Latvia Came through the Finan-
cial Crisis”. This book presents Latvia’s reform program as a success story, and an example of how crisis 
should be resolved (Åslund, Dombrovskis, 2011). The authors even suggested Latvia as a success story for 
the rest of the world to follow. This article will look at this “success story” both from the viewpoint to eco-
nomic developments as well as social progress.
Iceland has not been presented as a success story this way, but it followed an unconventional path with 
a large depreciation and the introduction of capital controls. Practically the whole banking system collapsed 
in few days in Iceland while the banking system in Latvia, with the exception of Parax bank, was rescued.
While Iceland and Latvia are both small European countries hit hard by the crisis it is important to keep 
in mind that in many ways they are very different. They have their own history and culture and they are at a 
different stage of development, economically and socially. Iceland remains outside the EU while Latvia has 
been an EU member for ten years. According to World Bank classifications Iceland is a high income OECD 
country while Latvia remains on the margin of an upper middle income and high income country and is still 
in transition where poverty and social exclusion remains a concern. 
The fact that Iceland and Latvia are small countries that were severely affected by the crisis and respond-
ed differently makes them an interesting comparator case. Nevertheless, because the countries are different 
this article will also make reference to other high and middle income countries in Europe when thought to 
be relevant and useful.
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2. Economic growth and social progress in the European Union (EU)
While the focus here is on Iceland and Latvia, the study can also have relevance for other countries. Im-
portant lessons maybe learned about the effects of different policy responses during times of crisis, including 
in the European Union and the Euro area. In fact, among the main reasons for new member states to seek 
membership in the EU has been its economic success. For the time being this success has disappeared. Both 
the EU and the Euro area continue to experience slow economic growth and high unemployment especially 
among its youth. Poverty and social exclusion is an increasing concern within the EU and income inequal-
ity is alarming in some countries. High levels of long term unemployment within the EU will without doubt 
influence long term growth in the area, but little attention has been given to this matter so far. 
Iceland recently decided not to continue with its accession negotiation with the EU and the negotiation 
team has been dissolved. Benefits of EU membership are in doubt, at least for the time being, and too many 
people feel that the EU has not adequately dealt with its problems, including a sick banking system where the 
strategy seems to be to buy time. There also seems to be a tendency to impose additional burden on taxpayers 
to keep the financial sector going and social problems are alarming, including dismal prospects for young 
people to find jobs.
3. Was there “government ownership” of economic policies?
When the crisis hit Iceland and Latvia the response in the two countries was very different. In reality 
Iceland had no choice other than let its national currency depreciate sharply. The depreciation in nominal 
terms was about 50 percent. Limited fiscal space and insufficient reserves in the Central Bank of Iceland 
meant that Iceland did not have capacity to defend its currency. This is clear and obvious and all statements 
that Icelandic government decided to depreciate its currency do not hold water. Iceland was isolated, and 
sufficient international assistance to defend its local currency, could not be assembled.
Latvia on the other hand went for internal devaluation attempting to cut wages (mainly public) and prices 
sharply. This response was consistent with its goal to adopt the Euro which it in January 2014. Latvia’s policy 
response was supported by a large international rescue package worth 7.5 billion Euros, then about one third 
of Latvia’s GDP. This package was provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union 
(EU), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank, and bilaterally by 
countries, especially Scandinavian that had made large investments in the banking sector. Even one of the 
Baltic State’s, Estonia, offered assistance to Latvia. Latvia’s adoption of the Euro required a peg with the 
Euro and this international effort enabled to Latvia fulfil its commitments.
Iceland, a non EU member, could not relay on the EU as Latvia did. Iceland could also not go to the 
World Bank or the EBRD since Iceland is a high income OECD donor country. Latvia with its EU mem-
bership and middle income status, when the crisis hit, had access to the multilateral development banks. In 
addition to this the foreign owners of the banks in Latvia were not passive bystanders during the crisis. They 
defended their own interests.
The Latvian government claims to have decided to keep a fixed exchange rate regime in Latvia, while 
the IMF initially suggested 15 percent depreciation. The policy to keep the exchange rate fixed was, however 
clearly favored by external interests, especially Scandinavian banks who owned most of the Latvian bank-
ing system and the European Union. EU interests feared the effects of a large depreciation on the banking 
sector in the other Baltic States and the Scandinavian countries that then could spill over to other EU mem-
ber countries. Disorderly devaluation would have caused a Swedish Banking crisis (Åslund, Dombrovskis, 
2011: 116).
When the banks were privatized in Iceland, they were sold to local interests or more precisely local ac-
tors with political interests and connections (see. e.g. Hilmarsson, 2013). No foreign investment was made in 
the Icelandic banks and no foreign banks were operating in Iceland when the crisis hit. This was fundamen-
tally different in Latvia where foreign investors became the owners of the banking system, except for Parex 
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bank. Given the size of the banking system in Iceland, with total assets more than nine times GDP4 the local 
government had no choice other than let the banks fall. In Latvia the mostly foreign owned banking system 
was rescued via a concerted international effort lead by external interests. It is highly questionable if Latvian 
government had any choice other than to rescue the banks if it wanted to keep good standing within the EU.
The IMF likes to talk about a strong government ownership of the reform program in Iceland and Latvia. 
In the initial phases of the crisis there was hardly much ownership in Iceland as there was only one way to go, 
sharp exchange rate depreciation and the collapse of the major banks. Latvian government ownership is also 
in doubt. As the IMF sais “The European Commission was heavily involved in program design, especially in 
the fiscal and financial sectors” (IMF, 2012: 7). Åslund and Dombrovskis state in their book when discussing 
the governmentʼs aggressive cuts in the education and health sectors: “Reform starts where the money ends” 
(Åslundand, Dombrovskis, 2011: 73). The policy was chosen because the flow of outside money had ended, 
not because the government or the people wanted to go this path. The foreign owned banks also had a strong 
voice and as IMF´s chief economist said in a recent article “if your financial sector is largely composed of 
foreign subsidiaries, it is a good idea to be friends with the parent banks” (Blanchard, et al, 2013: 33).
During the crisis capital controls were introduced in Iceland, but not in Latvia. The decision to introduce 
capital controls was supported by the IMF, and thus also the EU, whose member states are represented at 
IMFs board of directors. Those controls were introduced as a temporary measure. Capital controls helped 
prevent the currency from depreciating further than it did. Nevertheless the sharp depreciation resulted in 
balance sheet problems for household and corporate that still remain a hotly debated issue in Iceland. Adjust-
ment in corporate and household debts is debated and the current government has introduced a large package 
of debt relief for households that it may have problem delivering on when considering the limited fiscal space 
available to policy makers. The government plans to implement extensive tax cuts and large write-downs of 
household debt in the next 4 years. There is a high risk of free riding here. Those who took high risks and 
borrowed excessively will be allowed to impose costs on those who where more modest in their investments 
and borrowed little or nothing. Those who purchased more modest homes or rented a place to live will be 
punished. This is a dangerous path chosen by the government of Iceland.
In conclusion, it can be argued that neither Iceland nor Latvia had a choice when the crisis hit. Iceland 
could not save its banks and had little international support. Only after its banking system had collapsed did 
outside support emerge. In the case of Latvia, it also had no choice. External interests took control with a 
large rescue package. No country wanted to save the locally owned Icelandic banks, but in Latvia the foreign 
owners were keen to protect the financial system that was mostly in their ownership. The EU also feared 
domino effects of a banking collapse in Latvia and acted swiftly, overruling the IMF’s initial advise for a 15 
percent depreciation of the Lat.  
4. Economic outcomes in Iceland and Latvia
During the crisis Latvia suffered the greatest fall in GDP of any country in the world, around 23 percent. 
Iceland was less affected with GDP falling about 10 percent, see table 1. Prior to the crisis Latvia and Iceland 
had unusually large current account deficits – over 20 percent of GDP (see table 1; Latviaʼs current account 
deficit in 2007 was 22.4 percent of GDP). 
Imports declined by about 40 percent in Iceland and Latvia during the crisis and investment collapsed 
in both countries. Private consumption declined during the crises but growth has resumed in both countries. 
Both countries cut their government budget but public consumption adjusted more in Latvia than in Iceland 
(Darvas, 2011).
4 According to the IMF the consolidated assets of the three main Icelandic banks increased from 100 percent of GDP 
in 2004 to 923 percent at end 2007, reflecting expansion overseas. By end 2007, almost 50 percent of the three 
banks’ assets were held abroad (IMF, 2008: 11).
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Table 1. Real GDP, Consumer Prices, Current Account Balance, and Unemployment
Iceland 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Projections
Real GDP 1.2 -6.6 -4.1 2.9 1.6 1.9 2.1
Consumer prices* 12.7 12.0 5.4 4.0 5.2 3.7 3.1
Current account balance** -28.4 -11.6 -8.4 -5.6 -4.9 -1.2 -1.9
Unemployment*** 1.6 8.0 8.1 7.4 5.8 5.1 4.6
Latvia 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Projections
Real GDP -3.3 -17.7 -0.9 5.5 5.6 4.0 4.2
Consumer prices* 15.3 3.3 -1.2 4.2 2.3 0.7 2.1
Current account balance** -13.2 8.7 2.9 -2.1 -1.7 -1.1 -1.3
Unemployment*** 7.5 16.9 18.6 16.2 15.0 11.9 10.7
*) Movements in consumer prices are shown as annual averages.
**) Percent of GDP.
***) National definitions on unemployment may differ
Source: IMF, 2013a
Overall, the economic adjustment involved larger decrease in output, larger increase in unemployment, 
and more emigration in Latvia than in Iceland, see table 1 and 4. The question is whether an alternative 
strategy for Latvia could have achieved a better outcome, e.g. by depreciating around 15 percent as the IMF 
suggested. As Blanchard, et.al has stated nobody can give a definitive answer (Blanchard, et. al, 2013: 3).
After more than 5 years of adjustment, unemployment in Latvia is about 12 percent and GDP is still 
about 8 percent below the pre-crisis peak. Registered unemployment in Iceland is now below 4 percent. 
Both economies enjoy GDP growth rate that is much higher than the average EU or Euro GDP rate growth 
rates. Latvia’s GDP growth is projected by the IMF to be around 4 percent in 2013 while Iceland’s growth is 
projected around 2 percent5. According to Statistics Iceland, GDP increased by 3.1 percent in the first nine 
months of 2013 (Statistics Iceland, 2013b). Both countries have dramatically improved their current account 
balance and the IMF projects only a minor current account deficit in Iceland and Latvia6 in 2013 and 2014, 
see table 1.
5. Social impact in Iceland and Latvia
If one looks at unemployment, job losses were much more dramatic in Latvia than in Iceland. As stated 
above unemployment in Iceland is about 4 percent but about 12 percent in Latvia, close to the EU average, 
and twice the pre crisis unemployment rate. As the IMF has noted in a recent report, the labor market is 
improving, but unemployment, especially long-term unemployment is still high in Latvia (IMF, 2013b: 4)7.
Many economists were critical of Latvia’s reform program during the crisis. Nobel Prize-winning econo-
mist Paul Krugman, for example, stated that “They have made a desert, and called it adjustment” (Krugman, 
2011). The sitting Prime Minister of Latvia on the other hand stated that the “The greatest pleasure in life is 
doing what people say you cannot do...”8 (Åslund, Dombrovskis, 2011: 53). The question remains what costs 
5 The Statistical Office in Iceland reports higher GDP growth rate for Iceland than the IMF does. 
6 For a comprehensive analysis of Latviaʼs recent export performance, see Vanags (2013).
7 It remains unclear how far unemployment needs to adjust to reach the natural rate of unemployment in Latvia. Ac-
cording to Blanchard et.al 2013 output has not yet reached its potential and unemployment is not back to the natural 
rate? But they may not be very far (Blanchard, et.al, 2013: 3). The question remains, how can a country with a low 
minimum wage, weak unions, limited unemployment insurance and employment protection, have such a high natu-
ral rate of unemployment.
8 Here Åslund and Dombrovskis are citing Walter Bagehot, an English economist and journalist.
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the government is prepared to impose on its people to adjust and how is this likely to affect the social fabric 
and long term growth in the country?
Latvia’s claim to victory, post crisis, is to a large extent based on recent GDP9 growth and reduction in 
unemployment. It is true that according to this measure, Latvia is on a path to recovery, and its GDP growth 
appear to be healthy as compared with other EU11 countries and strong compared to EU15 countries cur-
rently with little or no growth. Recent data from the World Bank on Latvia, for example, show GDP growth 
rate of 5.6 percent in 2012, an estimate of 3.6 percent in 2013 and projection of 4.1 percent growth rate in 
2014 (World Bank, 2013). The two other Baltic States, Estonia and Lithuania, also compare well with other 
EU11 countries. However, one needs to review these numbers in the context of post crisis growth rates where 
Latvia was that hardest hit country in the world and lost about 23 percent of its GDP, see table 1. After 5 
years of adjustment Latvia’s GDP remains 11 percent below the pre-crisis peak. Nevertheless the returning 
to a path of grow this a welcome development.
Economic growth in Iceland remains lower which to a large extent is due to the fact that Iceland is a 
very open economy with most of its exports going to the EU that has recently had little or no GDP growth 
at all. The second estimate for the third quarter of 2013 from Eurostat shows Euro area GDP growing by 0.1 
percent and EU28 growing by 0.2 percent (Eurostat, 2013). Thus recovery in the EU remains both weak and 
fragile.
Few would doubt the importance of economic growth, as measured by GDP, as an indicator for the per-
formance of an economy, but the question remains if this indicator is sufficient to support Latvia’s claim to 
victory and to declare it a success story for other countries to follow.
6. Measures of economic performance and social progress and their limitations
How good is GDP as an indicator of economic and social progress in a country? It maybe worth review 
instatements that some Nobel prize-winning economists and policy makers have made about the importance, 
as well as the limitations, of GDP as an indicator economic development. 
Paul Samuelsson, for example, stated that “Without measures of economic aggregates like GDP, poli-
cymakers would be adrift in a sea of unorganized data. The GDP and related data are like beacons that help 
policymakers steer the economy toward the key economic objectives” (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1995). It 
is understandable that economists want to have a common measure of economic progress and development, 
but the views are diverse. The creator of GDP, Nobel Prize winning economist Simon Kuznets, once stated 
that “The welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income” (European 
Commission, 2013). Thus the creator and promoter of this indicator recognized its obvious limitations. More 
recently another Nobel Laurate, Joseph Stiglitz, has stated that “No one would look just at a firm’s revenues 
to assess how well it was doing. Far more relevant is the balance sheet, which shows assets and liability. That 
is also true for a country” (Foreign Affairs, 2005).
So it is clear that there are leading economists who view GDP critically including its creator who states 
that is does not measure the welfare of nations adequately. Regarding Stiglitz comments there are additional 
problems. Human capital is normally not included in company’s balance sheet, yet it is critical, both to a 
company’s profitability, and a countries growth.
Policy makers have also commented on GDP as a measure of economic development. Robert McNa-
mara, then the president of the World Bank, for example, commented that the “Progress measured by a single 
measuring rod, the GNP, has contributed significantly to exacerbate the inequalities of income distribution” 
9 Gross domestic product, abbreviated as GDP, is the most widely used measure of a country‘s overall economic 
health and development. As an aggregate measure of production, GDP is equal to the sum of the gross value added 
of all resident institutional units (i.e. industries) engaged in production, plus any taxes, and minus any subsidies, on 
products not included in the value of their outputs. Gross value added is the difference between output and inter-
mediate consumption. − See, further, for example, Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/
index.php/Glossary:Gross_domestic_product_(GDP)
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(European Commission, 2013). French president Nicolas Sarkozy once stated that “Nothing is more destruc-
tive than the gap between people’s perceptions of their own day-to-day economic well-being and what politi-
cians and statisticians are telling them about the economy” (Sarkozy, 2009). This is an interesting statement 
coming from someone who has played an important role in policy and decision making in the European 
Union.
7. Going “beyond” Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Recently there has been a movement to go “beyond” GDP when measuring progress within the EU. 
Given the very uneven developments in the EU in terms of economic and social progress it is understandable 
that the EU wants a more comprehensive picture on the status within the union. The EU has also performed 
poorly according to the GDP measure during the crisis, especially the EU15.What story would other indica-
tors tell about EU´s economic and social progress?
The Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress issued a report in 
200910. One can argue that the global economic and financial crisis has reinforced the need for additional 
indicators to assess the economic and social situation in the world, in particular poverty and social exclusion, 
risks and sustainability. GDP per capita and its growth over time does also not tell how economic benefits 
are shared within a society. “A 2008 Eurobarometer poll showed that more than two thirds of EU citizens 
feel that social, environmental and economic indicators should be used equally to evaluate progress. Only 
just under one sixth prefer evaluation based mostly on economic indicators” (Commission on the Euorpean 
Communities, 2009).
While the work based on the Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress continues, and new indicators are developed and introduced, one can review some of the 
indicators that are currently published by Eurostat. Among those indicators are the Portion of people at-risk-
of-poverty or social exclusion and at-risk-of-poverty rate. Regarding income distribution Eurostat calculates 
the Gini index and the Income quintile share ratio; see the table 2 below for results on Iceland and Latvia.
Table 2. Risk of Poverty, Social Exclusion and Income Distribution
Iceland 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Portion of people at-risk-of poverty 
or social exclusion
13.0 11.8 11.6 13.7 13.7 12.7
At-risk-of-poverty rate 10.1 10.1 10.2 9.8 9.2 7.9
The Gini index 28.0 27.3 29.6 25.7 23.6 24.0
Income quintile share ratio 3.9 3.8 4.2 3.6 3.3 3.4
Latvia 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Portion of people at-risk-of poverty 
or social exclusion
36.0 33.8 37.4 38.1 40.4 36.6
At-risk-of-poverty rate 21.2 25.6 25.7 21.3 19.1 19.4
The Gini index 35.4 37.7 37.4 36.1 35.4 35.9
Income quintile share ratio 6.3 7.3 7.3 6.9 6.6 6.5
Source: Statistics Iceland, 2013a
10 The commission included Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz, Chair, Columbia University, Professor Amartya Sen, Chair 
Adviser, Harvard University, and Professor Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Coordinator of the Commission, IEP. 
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8. Poverty, social exclusion and income equality in Latvia and in Iceland
Iceland and Latvia have both returned to healthy GDP growth rates post crisis, but how are these coun-
tries performing according to other indicators currently measured by Eurostat?
In 2012 the proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Iceland was the lowest in Eu-
rope, but among the highest in Latvia (only Bulgaria and Romania had higher ratios than Latvia). The rate in 
Iceland was 12.7 percent, 36.6 percent in Latvia, but 25 percent in the European Union. When focusing on 
those at risk of poverty the proportion was also lowest in Iceland or 7.9 present compared to 19.4 present in 
Latvia and 17.1 percent within the European Union. The at-risk-of-poverty threshold is defined as 60 present 
of median income in each country. Those who fall below that income threshold are considered to be at risk of 
poverty. Latvia´s distribution of prosperity as measured by the Gini coefficient is the most unequal in the EU.
One can argue that Iceland and Latvia should not be compared, using those indicators, because of the 
different income level. Latvia is on the margin of an upper middle and high income country, but Iceland a 
high income OECD country. However, one needs to keep in mind that the Czech Republic, a country with 
a similar income level as Latvia, has one of the lowest ratios in the European Union, both if one considers 
the ratios for the portion of people at-risk-of-poverty and social exclusion, as well as if one considers the at 
risk-of-poverty rate. Slovenia and Slovakia also perform much better than Latvia if one looks at those indi-
cators. Also if one considers income distribution according to the Gini index and the Income quintile share 
ratio the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia have are among EU countries with the most even income 
distribution and have an income distribution that is more even than the average both in the EU(27) and the 
EURO(17) area. 
In a recent IMF report one can find the following sentence: “Latvian authorities do believe that the cur-
rent degree of inequality is unacceptable and the high level of poverty, tracing back to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, should be reduced” (IMF, 2013: 2). Latvia’s performance on the four accounts shown in table 
2, measuring poverty, social exclusion and income equality, must be considered poor. Latvia has been an 
independent country for more than 20 years (since 1991) and a member of the European Union for 10 years 
(since 2004). Its policy makers must pay more attention to the problems of poverty, social exclusion and 
income equality, if they want to present Latvia internationally as a success story, and a model to follow for 
the rest of the world.
According to the EU (in its report Europe 2020) there is a high level of tax on low income earners in 
Latvia, high youth unemployment and 40 % of the population in Latvia is at risk of poverty or social exclu-
sion – one of the highest rates in the EU (European Commission, 2012). A recent Latvia Competitiveness 
Report argues that “Latvia’s high income inequality, is an indicator highlighting the presence of underlying 
competitiveness weaknesses that not only drive inequality but also negatively affect productivity“ (Cunskaet 
et al., 2012: 17).
Table 3. Poverty, Social Exclusion and Income Distribution
Countries GNI per capita (US$)
Proportion of people at-
risk-of-poverty or social 
exclusion
At-risk-of-
poverty rate The Gini index
Income quintile 
share ratio
Iceland 38.710 12.7 7.9 24.0 3.4
Latvia 14.180 36.6 19.4 35.9 6.5
Bulgaria 6.870 49.3 21.2 33.6 6.1
Romania 8.420 41.7 22.6 33.2 6.3
Czech 
Republic 
18.130 15.4 9.6 24.9 3.5
Slovak 
Republic
17.170 20.5 13.2 25.3 3.7
Slovenia 22.720 19.6 13.5 23.7 3.4
Source: Statistics Iceland, 2013a
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If one reviews the indicators considered by the European Union that measure social progress, Latvia 
seems to have much more in common with Bulgaria and Romania, than the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic, especially when one considers income distribution. This is not a favorable outcome for Latvia 
given that those countries only have about half of Latviaʼs per capita income and are the poorest countries 
in the EU. Latvia needs to reform its public policy before presenting itself internationally as a success story.
9. Emigration from Iceland and Latvia during the crisis
Latvia has claimed victory not only on the basis of GDP growth, but also referring to reduction in un-
employment. Lower unemployment certainly is a welcome development in Latvia, but one needs to keep in 
mind that emigration explains a part of the reduction in unemployment in both Iceland and Latvia. 
According to Darvas (2013) 8.5 percent of Latvians left the country from January 1 2008 to January 1 
2012, but 2.3 percent in the case of Iceland, see table 4. According to a recent survey only 20 % of the emi-
grants who left Latvia during the crisis report an intention of coming back within 5 years (Blanchard, et. al., 
2013: 30). Those who left tend to be younger Latvians with university education.
Iceland has over the decades lost people, but experience shows that a large share of those return when 
the economy recovers. In Latvia the largely permanent departure of the younger and more educated workers 
may indeed be costly for those who stay and those who leave may have little incentives to return as Latvia’s 
per capita income remains far below EU average. In contrast Iceland´s per capita income is high in the EU 
context so the incentives to return during normal times are more obvious than in the case Latvia.
Table 4. Population change from 1 January 2008 to 1 January 2012
Total population % change during 2008–2011 due to
Countries 1/1 2008
(millions)
1/1 2012
(millions)
% change Birth Death Other 
(= migration)
Latvia 2.27 2.04   -10.1 3.7 -5.3 -8.5
Iceland 0.32 0.32       1.3 6.1 -2.5 -2.3
Source: Darvas, 2013
Conclusions
The 2008 global economic and financial crisis hit hard in Iceland and Latvia. Economic developments 
prior to the crisis, as well as response to the crisis were, however, different in these two countries, yielding 
different results. The response of those two small European countries has received international attention and 
continues to be debated by leading economists in the world. 
If one looks at GDP growth, both countries are on a growth path. Latvia currently enjoys higher GDP 
growth than Iceland, but one needs to keep in mind that its GDP fell much more during the crisis and Latviaʼs 
GDP remains 8 percent below pre crisis peak. In Iceland unemployment is about 4 percent and only about 
one third of unemployment in Latvia about 12 percent. In Latvia unemployment is about the same as average 
unemployment in the EU, but twice the pre crisis level in Latvia. Neither economies has returned to full pre 
crisis health.
In terms of GDP growth and level of unemployment, Iceland has been successful, but problems related 
to its large currency depreciation, resulting in household and corporate balance sheet problems remain, and 
are hotly disputed in the country where the government has limited fiscal space to address those problems. 
It is also highly questionable if the government should use its limited fiscal space to implement actions that 
only favour part of the population that canʼt handle their private debts. One can argue that Iceland has be-
come a society where free riding is becoming popular. Households e.g. demand repeated debt restructuring 
that eventually will have to be paid by taxpayers and be a burden on the economy and future generations for 
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years to come. The current government has fuelled expectations in this area and this behaviour may result in 
much higher public debts and put further economic recovery at risk. As a result Iceland may continue falling 
behind the Scandinavian countries in terms of per capita income. 
Latvia has also achieved healthy economic growth and unemployment has gone down, but it still remains 
high. The government of Latvia, via its former PM, has presented the country as a success story for the rest 
of the world to follow. If one considers the social indicators and measures of income inequality that the 
EU measures and publishes, Latvia looks bad not only in comparison with Iceland, but also compared with 
countries at similar income level (e.g. Czech Republic and Slovakia. In fact, if one considers social progress 
Latvia has more in common with Romania and Bulgaria that have per capita income that is only about half 
of Latvia’s. Under those circumstances one can say that Latvia has shown some success, but the human costs 
remain high. Latvia can hardly be considered a success in the EU and a model for the rest of the world to fol-
low. Measuring GDP growth only is too narrow. The Latvian prime minister during the crisis considered the 
Latvian program to be a success, and stated that “The greatest pleasure in life is doing what people say you 
cannot do...” Neither the former PM nor the government, should take pleasure in seeing the dismal status of 
human development in Latvia and the EU, and IMF should not declare success when viewing the miserable 
social progress in Latvia.
Iceland and Latvia were both severely affected by the crisis and the policy response was different, in Lat-
via’s case with fixed exchange rate, and in Iceland with flexible exchange rate and large depreciation. Both 
countries adjusted and made sacrifices, implementing painful budget cuts. Both countries are enjoying GDP 
growth well beyond the EU and Euro area and unemployment has gone down although long term unemploy-
ment is still a concern in Latvia.
Neither Iceland nor Latvia have yet returned to full economic health and they face future challenges. 
By damaging the social fabric in Latvia, a burden has been placed on future generations, and many of the 
youngest and best educated have left the country. In Iceland, the planned debt forgiveness for households and 
corporate, risks imposing a burden on future generations, encouraging continued free riding, and is likely to 
result in slower economic growth, with Iceland falling further behind the other Nordic countries in terms of 
both income levels and living standards. 
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ISLANDIJA IR LATVIJA: EKONOMINĖ IR SOCIALINĖ KRIZĖ
Hilmar Þór Hilmarsson
Akureyri universitetas (Islandija)
Santrauka
2008 m. pasaulinė ekonominė ir finansų krizė gerokai paveikė Islandiją ir Latviją, tačiau šių šalių 
ekonominis vystymasis iki krizės ir pasirinktas atsakas į krizę bei jos rezultatai skyrėsi. Abi šalys krizės 
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laikotarpiu gavo paramą iš Tarptautinio valiutos fondo (TVF), kuris vėliau teigiamai įvertino abiejose šalyse 
vykdytas reformas. Šiame straipsnyje apžvelgiama ir įvertinama Islandijos bei Latvijos situacija po krizės 
tiek ekonominiu, tiek socialiniu požiūriais. Aptariama, kaip kitos valstybės ir tarptautinės institucijos paveikė 
reformų programas Islandijoje ir Latvijoje. 
PAGRINDINIAI ŽODŽIAI: mažos valstybės, Latvija ir Islandija, pasaulinė krizė, ekonominė politika, 
privatizavimas. 
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